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ADMINISTERING JUSTICE-THE MEDICAL
PREPOSSESSION.
"The State, in conjunction with the other guilds, will deal
with it by a just and righteous judgment."
quotation is from a recent document coming from conT HISserirative
and intelligent sources, recommending as a cure
for economic and commercial unrest, and other evils, the
creation of a League of National Guilds.
Underlying the whole scheme is the question whether it will
work. Assuming the tmth of the above quoted sentence, the outcome would be hopeful. This is, however, by no means an exceptional illustration of the child-like faith of the layman in his ability to create a tribunal which will administer "just and righteous
judgment."
Justice is the most important matter in human existence, and there
is nothing which will help the world, especially at present, as much
as justice.
·.
Any scheme, including that of the proposed League of National
9uilds, must be administered ultimately by human agents, and the
frailty of human nature is the principal reason why justice does not
always prevail. This has always been true.
No people in ancient times had a higher ~thjcal sense, an~ certainly no people had leaders who appreciated the need of "righteous
judgment" better than the Hebrews. Among them justice was ad·
ministered ·by the magistrate, usually sitting and holding his court at
the gate of the city. Questions involved must have been simple,
but justice did not always result, and largely because bribery was
a habit, although it was frequently cloaked under the expression of
free will gifts. One needs only to read how Samuel (perhaps the
most righteous man produced by the Jewish people) prided him·
self upon his integrity as a judge,1 while his two sons inducted by
him into the judicial office became notorious bride takers, 2 to under•
stand why the Jewish prophets continually preached "judgment,"
"justice'' and "righteousness." No judge, in this country at least,
· would think it appropriate to call attention to the fact that he had
administered his office honestly, because, with few exceptions, judges
are now honest. HQwev~r, conditions are different, and though
~
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Samuel, Chap. 1::, verses 3 to 6.
Samuel, Chap. 8, verses I to 3.
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bribery may be unusual, administering justice, either in the courts
or elsewhere, is, in the vast complexity of modem life, a difficult
matter in many respects, because of the same frailty of human
nature.
Directing our attention especially to the administration of criminal
justice, the best tribunal will be one which has at its disposal, in an
uncommon degree, such ordinary qualities as patience, common
sense and human sympathy. It would be better if such a tribunal
should know nothing of the controversy in question, and especially
not the facts from which the prosecution arises.
·
Roman jurispntdence, in its Golden Age, developed these merits.
Jn fact, under the Roman practice the trial judge was not supposeQ.
even to know the law. He certainly was not selected because of
his knowledge of science. He heard the evidence submitted to him,
and i£ a decision of the matter in controversy called for knowledge,
on his part, of any scientific matter, he secured advice thereon from
men who were versed in that particular science. To answer his
doubt as to the law of the case he inquired of the juris-consulti.
'rhe trial judge usually had the common qualities above commended,
which enabled him, if opinions varied, to choose the better advice.
Not only did this method result in the most remarkable system of
laws which the world has ever produced, but it worked remarkably well in prjlctice, until the evils incident to the Empire, and
resulting largely from conquest and prosperity, had undermined it.
It was when justice failed to be fairly administered that the Roman
Empire declined and fell. Human frailty was the underlying cause
thereof.
The English metliod of ad~inistering criminal justice is not the
result of a theory, .and certainly not (as in the case of the proposed
National Guilds) of a scheme prepared for the future. It is the
outcome of experience. It is tl_ie fruit .of centuries of agony endured by_ the English people. Our jury system is the principal
result of this historical experience. We have, therefore, also in
America at the present time, in the administration of criminal justice,
a judge, who is supposed to know the law, and a jury, which is the
final arbiter as to the disputed facts involved in the litigation. To
this tribunal, namely, judge and jury, the facts are submitted by
witnesses who know matters pertinent to the controversy. When .
a question of scientific knowledge arises, expert witnesses, ·i. e.,-...
persons who, in the particular branch of scientific knowledge, are
learned and experienced, are called to advise the tribunal upon
these matters. If all witnesses were honest, and if all experts un-
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derstood matters upon which they were called to testify, and
assuming that the judge and jury were capable and honest men,
the administration. of justice, even under the present complicated
conditions of life, would be as nearly ,perfect as one could desire.
While the jury, as a factor in the machinery of justice, has
received most severe criticism, one who understands English history
will agree that it is, perhaps, the most beneficial element therein.
With all of its weaknesses, it has worked. The value of the jury
(its province being to determine disputed questions of fact) has so
thoroughly approved itself that there is no civilized nation which
has not tried to incorporate the idea of the English jury into its
system of administering jtistice in criminal cases. With us, as
well as in England, the jury has, by constant ha:bit, been made
tolerable, if not admirable, but elsewhere the success of the jury
has varied, just.as the ability to use a new tool depends largely upon
the skill of tbe hands in which it is placed.
Erskine's words are as true now as they were in the year I799=
"Indeed, if I were to be asked what it is which peculiarly
distinguishes this·nation froi;n the other nations of the world,
I should say that it is in HER COURTS she sits above
. them: That it is to her judicial system she owes the stability
-of all her other institutions.' 13
The foregoing has been suggested upon reading a medico-legal
book written by Dr. George W. Jacoby.4 The. author is well vouched for as one learned in medicine, and especially in his particular
branch thereof. The book itself fully meets any expectation which
the author's name might create in one reading the book. Upon the
medical aspects of the subject, it seems to us that Dr. Jacoby has
herewith presented to the profession a valuable contribution on the
subject. The last half of the book, wherein is considered, under
•The quotation is from the early part of Lord Erskine's speech in defense of the
Earl of Thanet, and is quoted from page 407 of Volume II of the edition of Erskine's
Speeches, published by Reeves and Turner, of London, in 1870,
•The title page is reproduced in this note:
''The Unsound Mind and the Law",
A Presentation of Forensic Psychiatry, by George W. Jac6by, M.D.,
Author of "Child Training as an Exact ~cience"
Fellow of the New York Academy of Medicine, Member of the American Medical Asso-.
ciatlon, American Neutological Association, and New York Neurological Society,
Consulting Neurologist to the Hospital for Nervous Diseases, The Ger·
man Hospital, The Beth Israel Hospital, The Red Cross Hospital, and the Infirmary for Women and Children in
the City of New York etc.
Funk & Wagnalls Company Publishers, 1918.
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Part Second, "Psychiatric Expertism," and under Part Third thereof, "Special Anomalies" is above criticism, at least by one who is
not qualified to speak learnedly on this branch of knowledge. As
compared with previous literature on this general subjec;t, !the
author's work shows marked advance in the method of treatment
and arrangement, a~ well q.s in the views upon the matters therein
expressed. The Chapter on the "Examination of the Insane" (being
Chapter VI. of Part First) is· also of substantial value. I believe
that there is little to be criticised in these portions of the book. Cert~inly, I refrain from undertaking any such criticism.
Dr. Jacoby does not profess to be a lawyer, nor to ~ave had any
education or experience in the administration of justice, except as
he may have come in touch with the eourts as an expert witness.
I wish he had refrained from the expression of his· views regarding
the law. However, he is not the only medical scientist wl:io feels
that the law is a totally different proposition from medicine. The
assumption is that medicine is a learned science, which only a man
like Dr. Jacoby, who has studied it, and who has practised it during
his lifetime, can talk about as an expert, while, on the contrary,
any layman is quite competent to discuss the administration of
justice, and correct the evils therein, and for this purpose one learned in medicine is as capable as the ordinary layman. It is this attitude, and the expression thereof in this book, which calls for careful and painstaking consideration. I think the author errs as
much in what he says in his discussion of the law as he is, doubtless,
right in his comments upon medicine.r•
·
.
It has always seemed to me that, to produce a valuable book,
dealing seriously with two learned professions, collaboration· is
advisable. The most valuable general book on Medical Jurisprudence is that of Wharton & Stille, published in 1885. No extravagant
statements upon either law or medicine appear therein, because
each of the two authors attended especially to his own branch of
knowledge.6

a

s Justice Brooke expressed clearly, and in simple language, the qualification8 for
judicial duties, in his eulogy upon the late Justice McAlvay of the Michigan Supreme
Court. The proceedings had in the Supreme Court on this occasion on April 4o 1916, are
found in the Preface to Vol. l!ll of the Michigan Reports. I quote from Justice Brooke's
remarks, in support of my comments in the text, the following from page XXXVI:
"Few outside the profession have more than a vague notion of the law, or any intelligent
comprehension either of its excellencies or its defects."
·
·
•To aid the reader who may not have Dr. Jacoby's book at hand, these few excerpts
from "The Unsound Mind and the Law" are given herewith:
"Why is it that psychiatry which could and should he of so great aid tc> the jurist,
is as yet inadc<quately appreciated by judges and lawyers?
"The answer tc> these questions is that alt layme11-and jurists are laymen in this
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The author of "The Unsound Mind and the Law" believes that
judges should learn psychiatry _and other .branches of medicine.
Differing absolutely with Dr. Jacoby, I think that a study of medicine by our judges would be a mistake. I have seen it in practice
that a judge who professes to understand medicine is less qualified
thereby as a judicial officer. He cannot know all medicine, not
even all psychiatry, and a study of the subject will tend to make of
him that most dangerous man in the administration of justice,
. namely, a dilletante. It is the province of the medical expert to
advise the court and jury regarding scientific facts, when they come
into question.
The author likewise complains tha~ the law is "archaic," "conservative" and "stagnant,'' and he suggests that when a difference
arises the law should yield to the scien~e of medicine because
"medical facts alone are sta:ble." The error contained in this statement, which finds more or less acceptance outside of the legal profession, is a principal cause of the unsatisfactory administration of
criminal justice at the present time.
Confining my attention !O psychiatry, the constant changes in
medical scientific knowledge will ·s~irprise one who has not directed
his attention to the matter.
Tl:_ie meaning of the word "insanity" (which of course the law
accepted fro~ medicine) is a simple illustration of this change; or
regard-notwithstanding all efforts to enlighten them, still remain entirely ignorant con·
cerning mental disease and are prejudiced against occupying themselves in any way with
the questions it involves." Clntroduction, p. 7).
"The object of the physician who testifies in court should be no different, and it iS
this common purpose ¢at imposes upon the physician the duty of acquiring adequate
juristic knowledge, and upon the jurist the obligation to instruct himself in regard to
such facts in medicine and the natural sciences as are of importance in the field we are
now c•msidering." (Introduction, p. 4).
"The extent to which the subject-matter must consequently suffer becomes particu·
larly manifest when the more recent advances in psychiatric medicine are contrasted with
the conservatism, or let us rather say stagnation, that exists in English and American
laws in the same field." (Preface, p. v}.
"Wherever the existing law and modern medicine disagree, there is a tendency to
give the former a more plausible recognition than it actually deserves, or to assume that
the latter, notwithstanding its scientific basis, is at least problematic, and therefore to
attempt to fashion it to accord with the juristic mold." (Preface, p. v}.
"I laid stress upon the possibility that a person who had committed a criminal act
while under the bane of a morbid impulse of the will might be legally convicted, because
the law, while it accorded an exculpatory value to abnormal intellectual activity, dealt
otherwise with disorder5 that implicated the activity of the will." (Introduction. p. 3}.
"But it distinguishes only two poseibilities, responsibility and irresponsibility, a dis·
tinction which in many instances seems to be too abrupt and which represents a practical
hardship." (P. 81).
"It is for the latter group of cases that the adoption of the notion of restricted responsibility would be in accord with all scientific facts, as well as being a great practical
help alike to the judges and the medical expert." (P. Sa).
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development, in medicine, and of the serious injury resulting thereby to the law and its administration. The word "insanity," until
of recent date, has included defective development as well as lesion
of the mental faculties. 7 The law, in its legislative and judicial
branches adopted this definition of insanity from medicine. Legislation and judicial decisions used the word in this broad sense, and
the word connoted, substantially, mental deficiency from any
·source. 8
During comparatively recently years, however, the medical profession has (and I have no doubt with good reason) come to regard
mental deficiency, at least from the medical point of view, as a
radically different disease from other forms of insanity. At all
events the medical profession has made a distinction between mental
deficiency (that is, amentia) on the one hand, and insanity (that is,
dementia) on the other.
The valuable work by A. F. Tredgold, of London, entitled "Mental
Deficiency" ( amentia) first published in 19o8, and especially the
second edition, bearing date 1915, treats in a most satisfactory manner of the feeble-minded (aments), to the exclusion of the insane·
(dements). The discussion in Dr. Tredgold's book of the English
Mental Deficiency Act of I913, and the investigation which pre<:eded the enactment of that statute, are illuminative of this whole
subject.
Dr. Henry Herbert Goddard, Director of the Department of Research of Vineland Training School, New Jersey, has spent his life
in the study of the feeble-minded, and he is recognized, not only
in this country, but also abroad, as a leading authority upon the
subject.0
His narrative of the case of Gianini, included in the book on
"'!'he Criminal Imbecile," published by him in I9I5, impresses me
with the marv~llously accurate results which one learned in the
T The small book of Marshall D. Ewell, first" published in 1887, contains on pages
337 to 341, the classificatioM of insani~ by four of the learned alienists, including Dr.
Ray. Mental deficiency is included in most, if not all, of these classifications, under the
general term insanity.
·
•In Michigan legislation the words "insane" or "insanity" were used in the compre.
~ensive sense, and the words "feeble-minded" or "imbecile" did not appear until in recent
years. In 1873 was adopted an act providing for the barring of a woman's right of
dower in the la!_lds of her husband when she remained incompetent for two ye~rs or more.
The words "imbecile" ·and "idiotic" are used in this statute in addition to the word
"insane." This is exceptional, however, in earlier Michigan legislation.
9 Dr. Goddard's larger work is doubtless well-known to the medical profession, entitled-"Feeble-mindedness, its Causes and Consequences." "The Kallikak Family" and
the "Criminal Imbecile", etc., preceded the more serious work, and perhaps are inore
interesting to the layman.
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subject, and inclined to aid an intelligent judge, can, even under
great handicaps, accomplish. But the lawyer is surprised to find
that Dr. Goddard thinks that the Gianini case established "a new
standard in criminal procedure," because "it recognizes that weakness of mind, as an e.xcuse for crime, is of the same importance as
disease of mind;' ; he continues: "puts feeble-mindedness in the
same category with insanity, and requires that it, like insanity, be
considered in a11 discussions of responsibility. When we add the
now accepted fact that the feeble-minded are at least as numerous
as the insane, we see the- far-reaching significance of this standard
set by the Supreme Court of Herkimer County, New York."
(page 2).
Of course this is not true. It seemed to be true in this Gianini
case, as well as elsewhere, because the medical profession, which
taught the law to give one meaning to the word insanity, has now
limited it to one-half of the subject.10
Whatever the frailties of judges and lawyers may be, and they
are many, and however unsatisfactory the application of the principles of law to the particular case, when the defense of insanity is
raised, may have been, the law has always allowed for mental
incompetency.
"If there is any ground for complaint, therefore, it is not
that the law e.xcludes truth or theory, but that it does not
exclude humbug and ignorance. It is better that the doors
should be left open, for experience will rectify errors, and
may profit by discoveries. But no complaint is more ground·
less than tliat insanity, of whatever nature, cannot be allowed
for sufficiently in any court of justice."

With these words the late Justice Campbell of the Supreme Court
of Michigan closes a most interesting paper, prepared by him in
1870, upon the subject: "Does the Law deal fairly with Questions
of Insanity ?"11 Justice Campbell's article, nothwithstanding the
10 While I have not the book at hand, I have been advised that a recent book on
Mental Disease, generally accepted by the medical profession, and referred to as an
authority in medical education, deClares that the word insanity is not a medical term,
but is used only by the law and the legal profession.
llThe article ·herein referred to was read before the Medico-Legal Society of New
York, on December 8, 1870. We refer to the publication thereof, appearing in McdicoLegal Papers, First Series, published in 1889, by Clark Bell of New York. The article
is found on pp. 234. to 249 of the 3rd illustrated edition of the work. This article antedates the opinions of th~ Michigan Supreme Court written by Justice Campbell, affecting
Medico-Legal questions, shown in People v. Hall, 48 Mich. 482, and in People v. Millard,
s3 Mich. 03.
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lapse of time, contains the best discussion of the law, upon the
responsibility of the alleged insane, that I know of. In the clearness and simplicity of his language, and in the absolute correctness
of his attitude towards the law, and his fairness to the medical man,
the article is comparable to Lord Erskine's speech, delivered in 188o,
in defense of J ~es Hadfield.
I will rest with one other illustration (although there are many
!suggested in Dr. Jacoby's book) of the embarrassment resulting to
the law from the changes in scientific psychiatry.
Dementia praecox is the form of insanity which is most favored
by the medical profession at this time, and it is given a prominent
place in Dr. Jacoby's nook. While doubtless Kraepelin's work was
of substantial value in the study of mental disease, the law should
not be severely criticised if it does not at once .drop all the learning from medical science which_ preceded Kraepelin, and regard
dementia praecox as the last word on this subject. Clevenger's
work on Medical Jurispurudence of Insanity was well regarded by
both professions at the time it appeared in 1898, but the words
"dementia praecox" are not found in either of the two volumes.
On the contrary he has a chapter entitled "Vesanias," .being Chapter
XX in Volume I. Vesania is an unknown quantity in more recent
books, and is not found in that of Dr. Jacoby.
Dr. Reese's text book on Medical Judisprudence and Toxicology.
was one of the earliest American books upon this subject, and the
original author, and the revisors of the recent editions, were men
associated with the University of Pennsylvania, and it has appeared
continuously as a Blakiston publication, also of Philadelphia. The
Sixth Edition is dated in 1902 and the Eighth Edition in 19n. The
treatment of insanity, and the classification thereof, in the Sixth
Edition (see pages 323, etc., thereof) is substantially different from
that 'given in the Eighth Edition (see page 295, etc., thereof).
Dementia praect>x appears first in the Eighth Edition, as a principal division in the varieties of insanity.12
Therefore a judge, who had accepted medical learning on the
subject of insanity previous to the time when the profession generally adopted Kraepelin's views, would be required to completely
change his ideas upon this matter. I am impressed with the thought
that when Dr. Jacoby iq.sists that ju9,ges should learn medicine, he
would be content only if the court should know and adopt, as a
principle of law, opinions which Dr. Jacoby and his associates at
" Dementia praecox was pot known to the compilers of the Century Dictionary in
The supplement thereto, published in 19u, first mentions the words.

J890.
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the present time deem to be correct. The Court should disabuse
his mind of that :which he had with much labor learned previous
to the adoption of the prevalent views in the medical profession
with reference to dementia praecox.
Differing radically with the author in this matter, I believe that
the principal failing of the medical expert, especially in the branches
of knowledge dealing with the human mind, is the air of finality
with which he writes and talks. Almost continuously since the time
of Hippocrates has this been the attitude of medicine towards the
law. It is the comfortable assurance of the scientist that every
expert going before him, and differing from him, was wrong, but
that the view entertained by the present writer is not only correct
but ·it is final. The expert becomes impatient with the layman, and
especially with the judge and the lawyer who do not accept, upon
those tenns, the present statement of the psychiatrist. One has
only to review, in a cursory manner,· what is called the progress
of science in this branch of ktiowledge, to be impressed with the
fact that the views of Dr. Jacoby may not in all particulars be
right, and may possibly in the future ·be modified.
A timely antidote to this attitude of the medical profession is
found in an article which appeared in the December, 1917, Atlantic
Monthly, entitled "The Human Soul and the Scientific Prepossession." I am not accepting a brief in support of the views of Mr.
Warner Fite, the author of that article, upon psychology in general,
but it does seem that he is not far afield when he closes his vigorous
article with the following:
"All of these prepossessions find their logical expression,
however, in the cult of scientific management and scientific
efficiency. which, I should say, represents the real German
propaganda in this cotintry for a generation past. Every
one has his own theory of the war. To me it seems that if
the war has any deep-lying significance, it is war of humanity against the scientific prepossession."
Dr. Jacoby and I agree that there are miscarriages of justice in
the administration of law in the criminal courts .(and where is
there not?), but we differ radically regarding the causes and the
cure. The author in several places states that his book is limited
to "borderline" cas.es in psychiatry. Am~ng other things he believes
that the law should accept his (it may be a medical) doctrine of
restricted responsibility. He appreciates that the province of the
law is to determine responsibilty, and that this question may not
be the same as· the pathological one which presents itself to the
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medical man in his practice. While the expression of the legal
principle of responsibility of the alleged insane (as derived from
what is called the McNaghten case) is not altogether satisfactory,
it is at least workable. The purpose of a legal prosecution is to
determine the clear cut issue whether the defendant was, under
the rules of law, responsible for his act. If he was responsible,
the jury should find him guilty, and if he was not, the jury should
acquit him. This rule has the merit at least of being comparatively
simple. Even with the aid of medical advice it has not resulted
in a correct verdict by any means in all cases. If by "border-line"
cases the author means those in which the medical expert is uncertain, the law humanely applies the rules that a respondent in
a criminal case is presumed to be innocent, and that he must be
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. These elementary principles of criminal law have, also, been found to ·be. reasonable and
to be advisable. Such a doctrine as restricted responsibility would
not result in a more desirable administration of criminal justice.
It was a matter of surprise to learn, recently, from a conservative authority in psychology and allied sciences, that, during the past
quarter century, and as a result of the work of laboratories established for that purpose, "tests have been developed that are rapidly making the diagnosis of mental diseases as accurate as that
which has become possible in the earlier de_veloped clinical
branches." 18
Assuming that this statement is only moderately true, it is unfortunate indeed that the administration of justice should not in
some manner be supplied with this accuracy. Even the medical
profession, and certainly the public at large, understand that this
statement is far removed from the results which are seen to this
day in criminal trials, when mental disease is involved.
It is because. I know that Dr. Jac<;>by has a large and cordial
hearing in the t'nedical profession that I regret both the attitude,
which he assumes with reference to the legal aspects of this subject, as well as what he has written. I do not dwell upon the many
other items, similar to the foregoing, in which I feel he is wrongly
advised. In these respects the book is a dangerous one, not only
because it evidences Dr. Jacoby's attitude when he enters the court
as a medical expert, but also because his book gives to the medical
profession a false impression of the law, and a wrong idea of the
:is See Dr. \V. B. Pillsbury's article "The New Developments in Psychology in the
Past Quarter Century," appearing in Volume XXVI of the Philosophical Review for
January 1917, at pp. 58 and 59.
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province of the medical expert, of the judge, and of the jury, in
criminal cases.
It is apparent ~at his book will lead his fellow practitioner, who
has not equal education or experience as has the author, in mental
diseases, to assume that he can pose as a medical expert in court
upon these subjects~ and that he can fit himself for this difficult and
serious ~ndertaking by reading the author's book. It will result therefrom (as. has been the case· frequently in the past) that when the
queston of insanity is und~r consideration in a court of justice, there
will be presented to the judge and jury the views, not only of the
-learned, but .also of the tyros in medical knowledge,-all of them
talking with the same assumption of infallibility, but not all of them
talking alike. This is the principal reason for failure in the administration of justice in these cases. It is a cause of regret that, unintentionally perhaps, this book will aggravate the evil, rather than
allay it. There is altogether too much in medical instruction and literature tending to mcike the medical witness critical of the ministers
of justice..
The Supreme Court of Michigan felt compelled, in its opinion in
People v. Dickerson,1~ to hold that.some provisions of. the Michigan
statute of 1905, with reference to expert witnesses, were void, and
its conclusion in that opinion contained the following:
"We do not overlook the fact that the statute here considered was designed to correct an evil long recognized as tending to bring the administration of the criminal law into disrepute, in cases where insanity is urged as a defense, but we
are of the opinion that the true remedy for this evil rests in
the development of a livelier sense of responsibility to the
public for the proper and decent administration of justice on
the part of both the legal and the medical professions, rather
than in revolutionary legislation. That both professions recognize and deplore the existence of the evil, there can be no
doubt, and recent activities in both lend reason for hoping
that the scandal which has often attended the introduction of
expert testimony· will, in the future, cease to be a reproach in
the administration of criminal law."
·
Agreeing cordially with the views of the court in this respect, I
·commend the same to members of the medical profession who may
read.and be influenced by :'The Unsound Mind and the Law."
CLAro:NC:e A. LIGH'l'N:C:R.
Detroit, Michigan.
"' 164 Mich. 148 (1910).

